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FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF MINNEAPOLIS 
Restrictions  on  Financial  Intermediaries 
and  Implications  for  Aggregate 
Fluctuations:  Canada  and  the  United 
States  1870-1913 
1. Introduction 
Advances  in the economics  of information  have permitted  recent prog- 
ress  in  modeling  financial  intermediaries.  This  new  financial  inter- 
mediation  literature  is  somewhat  diverse,  but  the  models  generally 
follow  the approach  of specifying  an economic  environment  in terms of 
primitives-preferences,  endowments,  and technology-and  analyzing 
how  that environment  generates  financial intermediation  as an endoge- 
nous  phenomenon.  Several  things  are  gained  from  this  type  of  ap- 
proach: a deeper  understanding  of the  role of financial intermediaries 
as institutions  that diversify,  transform assets,  and process information; 
explanations  for bank runs; insights  into the role of financial intermedi- 
aries in aggregate  fluctuations;  and implications  for the effects of finan- 
cial regulations. 
One branch of this financial intermediation  literature, following  on the 
work of Diamond  and Dybvig  (1983), focuses  on deposit  contracts, bank 
runs,  and  bank  failures.  In the  Diamond-Dybvig  model,  the  banking 
system  has  an  inherent  instability.  Banks provide  a form of insurance 
through  the  withdrawal  provision  in deposit  contracts,  but this leaves 
banks  open  to runs,  during  which  the  expectation  of the  failure of an 
otherwise  safe  bank  is  self-fulfilling.  (This branch of  the  literature in- 
cludes  Postlewaite  and Vives  1987; Wallace 1988; and Williamson  1988.) 
Another  branch  of  the  financial  intermediation  literature,  which  in- 
cludes  work by Diamond  (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986), and William- 304 *  WILLIAMSON 
son  (1986), is concerned  with  financial intermediation  in general (rather 
than banking  in particular) and with  the features  of economic  environ- 
ments  (moral hazard,  adverse  selection,  and monitoring  and evaluation 
costs) that can lead to intermediary  structures.  Models  of this type have 
been integrated  into macroeconomic  frameworks by Williamson (1987b), 
Greenwood  and Williamson  (1988), and Bernanke and Gertler (1989) to 
study  the implications  of financial intermediation  for aggregate  fluctua- 
tions.  A  general  conclusion  of  this  work  is  that  the  financial  inter- 
mediation  sector  tends  to  amplify  fluctuations.  Bernanke  and  Gertler 
(1989) show  how  a redistribution  of wealth  from borrowers  to lenders 
increases the agency  costs associated  with lending,  causing a decrease in 
the quantity of intermediation  and in real output.  Such a wealth redistri- 
bution  might  be  associated  with  debt  deflations.  Williamson  (1987b) 
shows  how  some  kinds  of aggregate  technology  shocks,  which  produce 
no  fluctuations  in  an  environment  without  the  information  costs  that 
generate  an  intermediate  structure,  do  cause  fluctuations  when  these 
costs  are present.  (See Gertler 1988 for a survey  of other related work.) 
This  paper  has  two  purposes.  First,  for  those  unfamiliar  with  the 
recent  literature  on  financial  intermediation,  it shows  how  an explicit 
general  equilibrium  model  with  endogenous  financial  intermediation 
can illuminate  some  central issues  in banking and macroeconomics  and 
can  put  order  on  some  historical  experience  and  empirical  evidence. 
Second,  for those  familiar with  the intermediation  literature, this paper 
shows  how  a model  related to models  in Williamson  (1987b) and Green- 
wood  and  Williamson  (1988) can  be  used  to  study  bank  failures  and 
banking panics.  The model  here has some novel implications for the role 
of financial regulations  and bank failures in aggregate fluctuations,  and I 
find some  (qualified) empirical support for its predictions. 
The approach  I take is the following.  First, I study  a historical period 
when  monetary  and banking  arrangements  were  strikingly different in 
two countries.  In terms of what has a hearing on aggregate fluctuations, 
other than financial arrangements,  the two countries were quite similar 
in this  period.  Next,  I construct  a general  equilibrium  model  with  en- 
dogenous  financial  intermediation  which  can incorporate  the  financial 
arrangements in either country as special cases. Then I study the implica- 
tions of the differences  in banking and monetary arrangements for aggre- 
gate fluctuations  in the two  countries.  Last, I go to the data and judge 
whether  the theory fits the evidence. 
The period  I focus  on is the 44 years from 1870 to 1913, and the two 
countries  are Canada and  the  United  States.  Over this period,  Canada 
had a branch banking  system  with,  at most,  41 chartered banks,  while 
(in 1890) the United  States had more  than 8,000 banks,  and most  were Restrictions  on Finanical  Intermediaries  *  305 
unit banks.  Numerous  restrictions  on branching,  along with  other con- 
straints absent  in Canada,  tended  to keep  U.S.  banks  small.  Canadian 
banks were free to issue  private circulating notes with few restrictions on 
their backing,  but all circulating currency in the United States was effec- 
tively an obligation  of the U.S.  government.  In addition  to these  differ- 
ences  in banking  and monetary  arrangements,  the countries had differ- 
ent records of bank failures and panics. Average bank depositor losses  as 
a fraction of deposits  were roughly  60 percent larger in the United States 
than in Canada.  Also,  cooperative  behavior among  the Canadian banks 
acted to virtually preempt  any widespread  banking  panics,  so that dis- 
ruption  from financial  crises  was  considerably  smaller in Canada.  The 
history of widespread  bank runs and failures in the United States during 
the National  Banking Era (1863-1914)  is documented  in Sprague (1910). 
The model  presented  here  captures  the  important  features  of Cana- 
dian and  U.S.  monetary  and banking  arrangements  during  1870-1913. 
This model  is  related  to  others  constructed  in Williamson  (1987b) and 
Greenwood  and Williamson  (1988), in that it has costly state verification 
(Townsend  1979) which  provides  a delegated  monitoring  role for finan- 
cial intermediaries  (Diamond  1984; Williamson  1986). When  the model 
includes  a restriction on diversification by financial intermediaries,  inter- 
preted as a unit banking  restriction, banks fail with positive  probability. 
When  they  fail,  banks  experience  a phenomenon  which  can be  inter- 
preted  as a bank run.  Banks not  subject to the unit banking  restriction 
diversify perfectly, and they never fail. 
When  subjected  to aggregate  technological  shocks,  the model  yields 
patterns  of  co-movement  in  the  data  that  are  qualitatively  similar 
whether  or not  there  is a diversification  restriction or a constraint  that 
banks cannot issue  circulating notes.  The price level, bank liabilities, and 
output  are mutually  positively  correlated. Two important results: 
* Despite  the fact that aggregate  bank failures are negatively  correlated 
with  output  when  there  is unit banking,  the unit banking  restriction 
actually reduces  the unconditional  variance of output. 
* Introducing  a restriction that prohibits the issue  of private bank notes 
decreases  the unconditional  variance of output. 
These two results are consistent  with the view that intermediation ampli- 
fies  fluctuations.  That is,  both  restrictions  inhibit  intermediation,  and 
both reduce  the magnitude  of fluctuations. 
Banks fail for a quite  different  reason  in my model  than in Diamond 
and  Dybvig's  (1983).  Here,  the  unit  banking  restriction  results  in  a 
banking  system  in which  banks  are less  diversified  than they would  be 306 *  WILLIAMSON 
otherwise.  These  banks  are  therefore  more  sensitive  to  idiosyncratic 
shocks,  and  they  fail and  experience  runs  with  higher  probability. In 
Diamond  and Dybvig's  model,  bank failures and runs occur because  of 
an  inherent  instability  associated  with  the  structure  of  deposit  con- 
tracts. The Diamond-Dybvig  model  cannot  confront  the Canadian/U.S. 
differences  during  1870-1913.  It also  has  difficulty  with  the  Great De- 
pression,  when  Canada experienced  no bank failures while  U.S.  banks 
were  failing  in very  large  numbers.  During  the  Great Depression,  de- 
posit  contracts  in  the  United  States  and  Canada were  similar, Canada 
had no deposit  insurance,  and no Canadian banks suspended  convert- 
ibility. (For a study  of  Canadian  banking  in the  Great Depression,  see 
Haubrich 1987.) 
The model's  implication  that the unit banking restriction reduces fluc- 
tuations contradicts conventional  wisdom  about the role of bank failures 
in  the  business  cycle.  Several  studies  have  argued  that bank  failures 
propagated  negative  aggregate  shocks  during  the  Great  Depression. 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) see the propagation  mechanism  as acting 
through  measured  monetary  aggregates,  while  Bernanke  (1983)  and 
Hamilton  (1987) argue that there are additional,  non-monetary  effects of 
intermediation  on real activity. 
In the model,  government  deposit  insurance  in the unit banking  sys- 
tem acts to eliminate  bank runs,  but banks still fail. This arrangement is 
equivalent  to one where  banks diversify  perfectly and never fail. There- 
fore, after World War II, when  U.S.  and Canadian banks face the same 
restrictions on private note issue  and U.S. deposits  are insured,  the two 
countries  should  experience  similar  macroeconomic  behavior,  other 
things  held constant. 
To test  this  theory,  I examine  detrended  aggregate  annual  data  for 
Canada and  the  United  States  during  1870-1913  and  1954-87.  For the 
1870-1913  period,  new  gross national product (GNP) data have recently 
been  constructed  for the  United  States by Romer (1989) and Balke and 
Gordon (1989) and for Canada by Urquhart (1986). This makes the study 
of  this  period  of  particular  current  interest.  Of  the  aggregate  data  I 
examine,  the GNP data provide the strongest  support for the theory. The 
volatility of Canadian GNP is higher than that of U.S. GNP according to 
both  the  Romer  data  (56 percent)  and  the  Balke and  Gordon  data (11 
percent).  For 1954-87,  GNP  volatility  in the  two  countries  is approxi- 
mately equal.  Price level volatility is higher in Canada for the 1870-1913 
period,  but in the  1954-87  data there are some  inconsistencies  with  the 
theory in regard to price level volatility and co-movements  of prices with 
output.  In apparent  contradiction  to the theory, bank liabilities are less Restrictions  on Finanical  Intermediaries  *  307 
volatile in Canada than in the United States during 1870-1913.  However, 
there  are good  reasons  to believe  that this  volatility  difference  reflects 
measurement  error in the U.S.  data. 
The paper is organized  as follows.  In Section 2 I review  Canadian and 
U.S.  monetary  and  banking  arrangements  in  1870-1913.  In Section  3 I 
construct the model  and describe  its implications.  In Section 4 I discuss 
the empirical evidence.  The final section  is a summary  and conclusion. 
2. Monetary  and Banking  Arrangements  in the United  States  and 
Canada  1870-1913 
During the 1870-1913  period,  the United States had a unit banking sys- 
tem, as it still does  today. There were few barriers to entry in the banking 
industry,  but banks  faced  numerous  restrictions  which  tended  to keep 
them  small  and  to limit diversification.  In 1890, the  United  States had 
8,201 banks,  including  3,484 national  banks  (U.S.  Department  of Com- 
merce  1975).  Circulating  paper  currency  consisted  mainly  of  national 
bank notes  (in denominations  of $1 and more) and notes  issued  directly 
by the U.S. Treasury. National bank notes were more than fully backed by 
federal government  bonds at the time of issue and were guaranteed by the 
federal government.  All banks were  subject to reserve requirements. 
During  the  National  Banking  Era (1863-1914),  the U.S.  banking  sys- 
tem  was  subject  to  recurrent  periods  of  widespread  panic  and  bank 
failure,  as  is  well  known.  Pervasive  financial  crises  occurred  in  1873, 
1884,  1890,  1893,  and  1907 (Sprague  1910).  Figure  1 plots  percentage 
deviations  from trend (computed  with a Hodrick-Prescott filter; see Pres- 
cott 1983) in GNP and in bank suspensions  in the United States between 
1870 and  1913. There is clearly negative  co-movement  between  the  se- 
ries,  with  a  correlation  coefficient  of  -0.25.  Friedman  and  Schwartz 
(1963) and Cagan (1965) also find that panic periods tended  to be associ- 
ated  with  declines  in  real  output  growth  and  with  increases  in  the 
currency/deposit  ratio. 
At the  same  time,  Canada's  branch banking  system,  patterned  after 
Scottish  arrangements,  consisted  of,  at  most,  41  chartered  banks.  In 
1890, when  Canada's  population  was  slightly  less than one-tenth  of the 
United  States',  Canada's  38 chartered  banks  had  426 branches  nation- 
wide.  The granting  of a bank charter required federal legislation,  which 
created a significant  barrier to entry. However,  once  given  a charter, a 
bank faced few  restrictions,  at least compared  to U.S.  banks.  Canadian 
banks could issue  notes  in denominations  of $4 and more (raised to $5 in 
1880). A bank's note  issue  was  limited by its capital, but this constraint 308 *  WILLIAMSON 
Figure 1 PERCENTAGE  DEVIATIONS  FROM  TREND  OF U.S. OUTPUT  AND 
BANK  FAILURES  IN 1870-1913* 
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does  not seem  to have  been  binding  on the system  as a whole  through 
most of the period.1 There were no reserve requirements,2 but after 1890, 
5 percent of note circulation was held on deposit in a central bank circula- 
tion redemption  fund.  This added  insurance was essentially  redundant, 
since  notes  were  made  senior  claims  on  a bank's  assets  in  1880. Most 
bank notes  appear to have circulated at par, especially  after 1890 legisla- 
tion  that  required  redemption  of  notes  in  particular cities  throughout 
Canada. 
The striking difference  in the incidence  of bank failure in Canada and 
the United  States during the Great Depression  has been noted by Fried- 
man and Schwartz  (1963) and Bernanke (1983) and studied  by Haubrich 
(1987). From 1930 to 1933, more than 9,000 U.S. banks suspended  opera- 
1. In 1907, the constraint  on note  issue  appears  to have become  binding  during the crop- 
moving  season.  At  that  time,  the  federal  government  instituted  a  temporary  redis- 
counting  arrangement  with  the banks.  It was  made  permanent  with  the passing  of the 
Finance Act of 1914. 
2. If reserves  were  held,  one-third  (40 percent  after 1880) had  to be held  in the  form of 
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tions  (Friedman  and  Schwartz  1963),  but  no  banks  failed  in  Canada 
between  1923 and 1985. The record of bank failures in the two countries 
during 1870-1913,  while  showing  less striking differences than that, also 
indicates  that the incidence  of bank failure was lower and the disruptive 
effects of these  failures were  considerably  smaller in Canada than in the 
United States. 
Table 1 displays  statistics on bank liquidations in Canada during 1870- 
1913. In total, Canada had 23 bank liquidations  while,  at the same time, 
the United  States had 3,208.  This evidence  clearly overstates  the differ- 
ence  between  Canadian  and  U.S.  bank  failure  rates,  since  Canadian 
banks were  larger than  U.S.  banks and Canadian GNP and population 
were  less  than one-tenth  of the corresponding  quantities  in the United 
States during that period.  Thus, the failure of an average-sized  Canadian 
bank would  potentially  have  had a much  larger effect on the Canadian 
Table  1  THE  23 CHARTERED  BANK  LIQUIDATIONS  IN CANADA 
IN 1870-1913 
%  of  Face  Value  of Bank 
kYear  of  Lab  e  Liabilities  Paid  to 
Year  of  Liabilities  at 
Suspension  Suspension  ($)  Note  holders  Depositors 
1873  106,914  .00  .00 
1876  293,379  100.00  100.00 
1879  547,238  57.50  57.50 
136,480  100.00  96.35 
1,794,249  100.00  100.00 
340,500  100.00  100.00 
1881  1,108,000  59.50  59.50 
1883  2,868,884  100.00  66.38 
1887  1,409,482  100.00  10.66 
74,364  100.00  100.00 
1,031,280  100.00  100.00 
2,631,378  100.00  99.66 
1888  3,449,499  100.00  100.00 
1893  1,341,251  100.00  100.00 
1895  7,761,209  100.00  75.25 
1899  1,766,841  100.00  17.50 
1905  388,660  100.00  100.00 
1906  15,272,271  100.00  100.00 
1908  16,174,408  100.00  100.00 
560,781  100.00  30.27 
1,172,630  100.00  100.00 
1910  549,830  100.00  100.00 
1,314,016  100.00  .00 
Source:  Beckhart (1929, pp. 480-81) 310 *  WILLIAMSON 
economy  than the failure of an average-sized  U.S. bank would  have had 
on the U.S.  economy. 
According  to Table 1, noteholders  of failed banks received  100 percent 
of the face value  of their liabilities in 21 of the 23 Canadian bank liquida- 
tions,  and  depositors  received  100 percent  in  12 of the  23. This might 
indicate  relatively  little  economic  disruption  from Canadian  bank  fail- 
ures,  but  that conclusion  requires  comparable  statistics  for the  United 
States. Table 2 displays  some data on bank depositor  losses  in the United 
States. These are 16- and 20-year averages  of annual losses  to depositors 
as a percentage  of total deposits.  For the  years in which  bank failures 
occurred  in  Canada,  similar  Canadian  statistics  are  also  provided  in 
Table 2. Thus,  on average in the years under study, losses  to depositors 
were 0.11 percent  of total deposits  in the United States and 0.07 percent 
in Canada. By this measure,  the disruption  from bank failures appears to 
have been  significantly  smaller-57  percent smaller-in  Canada than in 
the United  States. 
Further, Canadian chartered banks had cooperative arrangements that 
tended  to mitigate  the adverse  effects  of bank failures.  Canadian banks 
were  mainly  self-regulated,  with  a formal  organization,  the  Canadian 
Bankers'  Association,  established  in  1891  and  given  special  powers 
through  legislation  in  1900. The largest banks,  particularly the Bank of 
Table  2  BANK  DEPOSITOR  LOSSES  AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL  DEPOSITS 
Country  Year  Annual Percentage* 
United States  1865-1890  .19% 
1881-1900  .12 
1901-1920  .04 
1865-1920  .11% 
Canada**  1873  .03% 
1879  .15 
1881  .20 
1883  .69 
1887  .87 
1895  .89 
1899  .47 
1908  .04 
1910  .14 
1914  .05 
1867-1920  .07% 
*For  multi-year  spans, average  annual  percentages. 
**For  years not included, the annual  percentage  was zero. 
Sources:  FDIC (1941), Beckhart (1929) Restrictions  on Finanical  Intermediaries  *  311 
Montreal,  appear  to have  been  willing  to act as informal lenders  of last 
resort  and  to  step  in  to  help  reorganize  troubled  banks.  This  excerpt 
from Johnson  (1910, pp.  124-125)  is illustrative: 
On the evening of October  12 [1906] the bankers  in Toronto  and Montreal  heard 
with surprise that the Bank of Ontario had got beyond  its depth  and would not 
open its doors the next morning. . . .  The leading bankers  in the Dominion 
dreaded the effect which the failure of such a bank might have. The Bank of 
Montreal agreed to take over the assets and pay all the liabilities, provided  a 
number of other banks would agree to share with it any losses. Its offer was 
accepted  and a representative  of the Bank of Montreal took the night train for 
Toronto.  Going breakfastless  to the office of the Bank of Ontario he found the 
directors at  the end of an all-night session and laid before them resolutions 
officially transferring the business and accounts of the bank to the Bank of 
Montreal. They adopted  the resolution before  9 a.m. and the bank  opened  busi- 
ness for the day with the following notice over the door: "This is the Bank of 
Montreal." 
Before 1 o'clock the same notice, painted on a board  or penciled on brown 
wrapping paper, was over the door of the 31 branches  in different  parts of the 
Dominion. Its customers  were astonished  that day when they went to the bank, 
but none of them took  alarm  and many of them  were  well pleased  with the  change. 
The  collective  behavior  of  Canadian  banks  not  only  served  to mini- 
mize  the  costs  of  liquidating  insolvent  institutions;  it also  appears  to 
have  prevented  widespread  banking  panics.  Any  bank  runs  seem  to 
have  been  confined  to  individual  banks  or  branches  (U.S.  Congress 
1910). While  U.S.  banks  had  cooperative  arrangements  during  the Na- 
tional Banking Era, particularly clearinghouses  (Gorton 1985), the ability 
of U.S. banks to act as a single  coalition could not approach that of their 
Canadian counterparts. 
The  government  of  Canada  had  a monopoly  on  the  issue  of  small- 
denomination  notes  during  1870-1913,  but circulating currency in large 
denominations  consisted  mostly  of  bank  notes  (Johnson  1910). There 
was a limited issue  of Dominion  notes,  backed 25 percent by gold and 75 
percent  by  government  securities,  with  additional  issues  backed  100 
percent by gold.  Legislation  periodically  increased  the limit on the frac- 
tionally gold-backed  component  of government-issued  currency. 
3. The  Theory 
The purpose  of  this  section  is  two-fold.  First I will  construct  a model 
which captures the essential  features of the banking and monetary struc- 312 *  WILLIAMSON 
tures of Canada and the United States during the period of interest. 
Then I will explore the implications of this theory for the interaction 
between financial  structure  and macroeconomic  fluctuations. 
Secton 2 described two important differences  between Canadian  and 
U.S. banking and monetary arrangements in 1870-1913. One is that 
Canadian bank liabilities were much less subject to idiosyncratic  risk 
than were U.S. bank liabilities.  The Canadian  system let Canadian  banks 
become larger than U.S. banks, and branch banking allowed greater 
geographical diversification. Further, the cooperative behavior among 
Canadian banks helped to insure depositors against losses. The other 
important difference is related to the fact that Canadian banks could 
issue circulating  notes in large denominations and back them with pri- 
vate assets. In the United States, only national  banks could issue notes, 
and these  notes  had to be backed 111 percent by U.S. government 
bonds. Thus, Canadian bank notes could perform an intermediation 
function while U.S. bank notes could not (to the extent that breaking  up 
government bonds into small denominations  is an insignificant  function 
compared  to the intermediation  normally  done by banks). 
The model should be able to replicate  the differences  in the U.S. and 
Canadian  experiences with regard  to bank failures.  That  is, bank failures 
should be negatively correlated with aggregate activity, and the inci- 
dence of bank failure should be higher in the model U.S. economy than 
in the model Canadian  economy. 
The model constructed here is related to the models in Williamson 
(1987b)  and Greenwood and Williamson (1988), with some differences 
designed to capture the problem at hand. This model abstracts from 
reserve requirements,  interest-bearing  government debt, and the opera- 
tion of the gold standard  monetary  regime. 
3.1 THE  MODEL  CANADIAN  ECONOMY 
3.1.1. Environment This is a model of a closed economy which has a 
continuum of two-period-lived agents born in each period t  =  1, 2, 
3,  ....  The  measure  of  a  generation  is  N.  Each generation  has  two 
types of economic agents, lenders  and entrepreneurs.  Lenders  each receive 
an indivisible  endowment of one unit of time when young and maximize 
Et(5et-et-et+l+c-t+),  where Et  is the expectation  operator  conditional  on 
period t information, 8 is an individual-specific  parameter  denoting the 
value to a lender of consuming leisure, Et  is leisure, et  is effort  expended, 
and ct  is consumption. Lenders  can use their single unit of time in period 
t either to produce one unit of the period t consumption good or to 
consume one unit of leisure. Entrepreneurs  have no endowments of 
time, the consumption good, or effort in either period of life. A genera- Restrictions  on Finanical  Intermediaries  *  313 
tion t entrepreneur  has  access  at time  t to an investment  project which 
requires  K units  of  the  time  t consumption  good  as input  in  order to 
operate,  where  K is  an  integer  greater  than  1.  If funded,  the  project 
yields  a random return z,  for which  Pr[zw  -  w] = H(w,  O,t); here, H(*,-,*) 
is differentiable  in all its arguments  and is twice differentiable in its first 
argument.  Let h(w,O,  4)  D1H(w,  0, 4) denote the probability density func- 
tion,  which  is positive  on  [0,w].  The variable  4t  affects  the investment 
projects of all entrepreneurs,  and  0 is an entrepreneur-specific  parame- 
ter  which  orders  probability  distributions  according  to  first-order 
stochastic  dominance.  That is,  D2H(w,0,0t) <  0 for 0 <  w <  w. Project 
quality  strictly  improves  as  0 increases.  For fixed  0,  an  increase  in 4 
produces  an increase in the riskiness of the project return without  chang- 
ing  its  expected  value.  That is,  an increase  in  ) is a mean-preserving 
spread (Rothschild  and Stiglitz 1970), though  this is carried out in such a 
way  that probability mass  is shifted  only  for lower values  of w. Specifi- 
cally, fo'D3H(x,0,0))  dx <  0 for 0 < w < w, D3H(x,0,))  =  0 for w >  K, and 
o'xD3h(x,0,4) dx = 0. 
Assume  that the aggregate  shock  <t follows  a two-state  Markov pro- 
cess.  That is, ,t  =  4i for i =  1, 2, and Pr[,t+1 = 0l1t  =  bi]  = qi  for i =  1, 2, 
where 0 < qi <  1 and 02 >  ,1  for i = 1, 2 and q,  - q2.  Aggregate  shocks are 
therefore  non-negatively  serially  correlated,  and  all project returns are 
riskier in state 2 than in state 1. 
Project returns  are independently  distributed  across  entrepreneurs. 
As  in Townsend  (1979,  1988), there is costly  state verification.  That is, 
entrepreneurs  can observe  the return on their own  project, w, but any 
other agent  expends  y units of effort to observe  w. 
Lenders  who  choose  to  produce  the  consumption  good  in  period  t 
save the entire amount,  by acquiring fiat money  or investing  (directly or 
indirectly)  in an entrepreneur's  project.  There is a fixed quantity  of Mo 
units of perfectly divisible  fiat money  which is in the hands of a group of 
old agents  at t =  1. These  agents  supply  fiat money  inelastically  so as to 
maximize consumption.  Claims on period t +  1 consumption  exchanged 
for the period  t consumption  good  can take one  of two  forms: they  are 
either deposit claims or notes. Deposits  and  notes  are identical  from the 
point of view  of the issuer, but a lender who holds a deposit incurs a cost 
of  3 units of effort and a note holder, a cost of a units of effort. There are 
no costs associated  with holding  fiat money. The parameters a and /  are 
lender-specific,  as is 6. 
The  fact that  asset  claims  are named  deposits and  notes at this  stage 
in  the  analysis  is  premature,  since  I have  not  yet  established  that ar- 
rangements  corresponding  to  real-world  banking  institutions  might 
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functions  for two  types  of intermediary  liabilities,  deposits  and  notes, 
which  are  both  backed  by  the  same  portfolio  of  loans  to  entrepre- 
neurs.  With  costs  of  holding  the  two  liabilities  and  the  costs  differing 
among  lenders,  it is  simple  to  obtain  well-defined  demand  functions 
for intermediary  liabilities,  without  having  to explicitly  specify  the spa- 
tial and  informational  features  that  cause  some  agents  to  prefer  one 
type  of intermediary  liability to another,  even  if their returns are iden- 
tical.  In terms  of  the  ultimate  optimal  financial  arrangement,  the  cost 
a can be interpreted  as the cost in inconvenience  associated  with  hold- 
ing  a large-denomination  bank  note  as  opposed  to  perfectly  divisible 
fiat money.  Similarly, /3 can be  interpreted  as  the  cost  of carrying out 
an  exchange  using  a  check-writing  technology  rather  than  fiat  cur- 
rency.  These  costs  might  plausibly  be  thought  to  differ  among  indi- 
viduals  or types  of transactions. 
To obtain simple demand  functions  for intermediary liabilities, assume 
there are three  types  of lenders.  Type 1 lenders  have  a  =  3 =  o, type 2 
lenders  have  8 =  0 and  3 = oo,  and type 3 lenders  have 8 = 0 and a = oo 
The fraction of agents  in any generation  who  are type i lenders is r1i.  The 
measure  of agents  in a generation  with  86  8' is r71A(8'),  the  measure 
with a c  a' is q72B(a'),  and the measure with p -3'  is r3F(/3').  Here, A(.), 
B(.),  and  F(.)  are distribution  functions  which  give  the  distribution  of 
parameter  values  across  each  lender  type.  Let a()  =  DA(8),  b(a) 
DB(a), and f(/)  = DF(1), where a(f), b(-), and f(.) are positive on R,. In 
equilibrium,  type  1 lenders  will substitute  as a group between  consum- 
ing  leisure  and  holding  fiat money,  type  2 lenders  will  substitute  be- 
tween  fiat money  and notes,  and type 3 lenders  will substitute  between 
fiat money  and deposits. 
Let  '74  denote  the  fraction  of  agents  who  are  entrepreneurs,  with 
7)4G(O')  being  the fraction of agents  who  are entrepreneurs  with  0 -  0'. 
Let g(O)  DG(8), with g(-) positive  on [0,0] for 0 >  0. Assume  that 
rw 
xh(x,O,41) dx>  K 
rw 
xh(x,Q,l)  dx <  K 
and 7r4K  <  172  +  r/3.  Therefore,  for the equilibrium to be examined,  there 
will  always  be  some  projects  funded,  some  projects  not  funded,  and 
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3.1.2.  Financial Arrangements  For investment  projects  to  be  financed, 
lenders  and  entrepreneurs  need  to make contractual arrangements.  As 
in  the  costly  state  verification  setups  of  Townsend  (1979),  Gale  and 
Hellwig  (1985), and Williamson  (1986) and (1987a), assume  the following 
commitment  technology  and sequence  of moves  by the contracting par- 
ties.  In any  period  t,  the  lenders  jointly  funding  investment  projects 
agree among  themselves  on rules for dividing  the period t + 1 payments 
from  entrepreneurs.  No  lender  can  observe  payments  made  to  other 
lenders  by  the  entrepreneur.  Lenders  make  commitments  in  period  t 
about how  they will respond  to declarations by an entrepreneur  at t +  1 
about the project outcome,  and payment  schedules  are set. In period t + 
1,  an  entrepreneur  declares  a  particular  project  outcome,  wd, and  a 
lender then incurs the verification cost if wd  E S or does not incur the cost 
if wd E S, where  S is the verification set. Note that stochastic verification 
is ruled out.3 Payments  from the entrepreneur  to lenders  depend  on the 
entrepreneur's  declaration and on the results of the lenders'  state verifi- 
cation, if it occurs. 
Let rt denote  the market expected  return per unit of the consumption 
good invested  by lenders  in entrepreneurs'  projects, and let Rt(w)  denote 
the payment  to the lenders  in a given  project by an entrepreneur.  Then, 
from  Williamson  (1987b) and  Greenwood  and  Williamson  (1988),  the 
following  is  an  optimal arrangement. Lenders  delegate  monitoring  to  a 
financial intermediary  (as in Diamond  1984 and Williamson  1986). The 
entrepreneur  makes a non-contingent  payment  of xt to the intermediary 
if w -  xt and pays the intermediary w if w < xt. The expected return to the 
intermediary is then 
jr(xt,  O,)  =  ft  (w-y)h(w,,0t)  dw + xt[1-H(xt, O,)]  (1) 
or, integrating  by parts, 
jr(xt,O,4(t) =t  -  f  H(w,O,(t) dw -  yH(xt,  ,t).  (2) 
Jo 
3. As Townsend  (1988) shows,  allowing  for stochastic  verification in more general  setups 
yields an optimal arrangement  which in general bears little resemblance to a simple debt 
contract. Restricting attention to non-stochastic  monitoring in my context lends consider- 
able  tractability to  the  analysis.  Bernanke  and  Gertler (1989),  in  a model  with  some 
similar features,  show  how  some  of their results  remain intact with  stochastic  verifica- 
tion. This suggests  that the operating  characteristics of this model may not change if the 
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The optimal contract between  an intermediary  and an entrepreneur  is a 
debt  contract, as in Gale and Hellwig  (1985) and Williamson  (1987a). That 
is,  there  is  a fixed  promised  payment,  and  if the  entrepreneur  cannot 
meet  it,  then  bankruptcy  occurs  and  the  entrepreneur  consumes  zero. 
The verification  cost,  y, can be interpreted  as a cost of bankruptcy. 
Intuitively,  this contract is optimal  since,  first, incentive  compatibility 
requires that the  payment  be non-contingent  in the event  that verifica- 
tion does  not occur. Second,  since risk sharing is not a factor here, with 
risk-neutral agents,  maximizing  the payment  in verification states mini- 
mizes  the  probability  of verification  and  therefore  minimizes  expected 
verification costs. 
Assume  that  Tr(x,O,4t) is strictly concave  in its first argument  for 0 E 
[0,0] and  4t  =  4i for i =  1, 2.  Then  there is a unique  x(0,,t)  such  that 
7r(x,0,4t) reaches  a maximum  for x  =  x(0,,t)  with  fixed  0 and  't  and 
(8,0,t) E  (O,w). Entrepreneurs  for  whom  7xr((0,0t),0O,t)  - rtK receive 
loans, while  those with  X(,x(  ,4t),O,jt)  < rtK  do not. For the entrepreneurs 
receiving  loans,  the promised  payment  xt satisfies 
rt(xt,  60,t)  =  rtK.  (3) 
Note  that xt decreases  with  0; that is,  the loan interest rate is lower  for 
higher-quality  projects. 
Financial intermediaries  are those  type  3 lenders  with  3 =  0.  These 
intermediaries  are able to commit  to making  non-contingent  payments 
of rt to each of their depositors  and note holders by holding  large portfo- 
lios  and  achieving  perfect  diversification.4  Since  each  of an intermedi- 
ary's depositors  and note  holders  receives  rt with  certainty, the liability 
holders  need  never monitor  the intermediary. 
This optimal  arrangement  captures  some  important features of finan- 
cial intermediation  arrangements  observed  in the real world,  including 
asset  transformation,  diversification,  information  processing,  and  the 
fact that intermediaries  hold debt in their portfolios. 
3.1.3.  Equilibrium  In equilibrium,  there is some  60 such  that entrepre- 
neurs  with  0 -  O' receive  loans  while  those  with  0 <  Ot do  not.  Let xt 
denote  the  promised  payment  for the  marginal borrower; that is,  xt = 
x( ;,0).  Then 
'T(X;,Ot,t ) =  rtK  (4) 
4. Formal arguments  rely on the law of large numbers  (Williamson 1986, 1987b), although 
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and 
Dlr(xt,O,t  ) =  0.  (5) 
Since  7r(,-, ) is concave  in its first argument,  equations  (4) and (5) solve 
for x; and  O' given  rt. Using  (2) to substitute  in (4) and (5) gives  (6) and 
(7): 
xt -  f  H(w,  t,Ot) dw -  yH(xt;,0,t)  =  rtK  (6) 
1 -  H(x;,t,6,)  =  yh(xt,Ot,t)  =  0.  (7) 
Given the market expected  return rt,  (6) and (7) determine  x' and 06. 
Let  Pt denote  the  price  of  fiat  money  in  period  t,  in  terms  of  the 
consumption  good.  The expected  return on fiat money in period t is then 
Etpt+l/pt.  The type  1 lender who  is indifferent between  consuming  leisure 
and producing  the consumption  good  to exchange  for fiat money  has 8 
=  Etpt+l/pt.  Similarly, the type 2 lender who  is indifferent between  hold- 
ing intermediary notes and holding  fiat money  has rt -  a = Etpt+,lpt.  And 
the type 3 lender who is indifferent between  holding intermediary depos- 
its  and  holding  fiat  money  has  rt  -  ,  =  Etpt+l/pt. Equilibrium  in  the 
market for fiat money  therefore implies  that 
771A(EtPt+1/pt)  +  r2[1-B(rt-EtPt+,lpt)]  +  rq3[1-F(rt-Etpt+l/pt)]  =  ptMo  (8) 
where  the left side  of (8) is the  demand  for fiat money  (with  the three 
terms  representing  the  demand  for fiat money  by type  1, type  2,  and 
type 3 lenders,  respectively)  and the right side of (8) is the supply  of fiat 
money.  In the credit market, equilibrium implies  that 
'q2B(rt-Etpt+l/pt) +  773F(rt-Etpt+l/pt) =  r4K[1-G(O;)]  (9) 
where  the  first term on  the  left  side  of  (9) is credit supplied  (through 
financial  intermediaries)  by  note  holders,  the  second  term on  the  left 
side  is credit supplied  by intermediary  depositors,  and the right side is 
credit demanded  by entrepreneurs. 
Now  restrict attention  to the stationary monetary  equilibrium,  where 
Pt >  0 for all t and quantities  and prices depend  only on the state, 4t. Let 
subscripts  denote  the state. Then 
t  =  i,,  i =  1, 2.  (10)  Etpt+1  = qiPl +  (1-qi)P2, 318 *  WILLIAMSON 
Let p =  p1/P2.  Then from (8), (9), and (10) come (11), (12), and (13): 
q,A(ql  + (1 -q)/p)  +  2[1  - B(r1-q -(1-ql)/p)]  +  q3[1  -F(rl -q1 -(1  -q1)/)] 
-  lp{qA(q2p+l-q2)  +  -2[1-B(r2-q2p-l+q2)]  +  n3[1-F(r2-q2--1+q2)]}  = 
o  (11) 
1q2B(r1-q1-(1-ql)/p) +  rl3F(r1-q1-(1-q1)/1)  =  rn4K[1-G(6O)] (12) 
2B(r2-q2p-l  +q2)  +  'q3F(r2-q2-l1+q2)  =  q14K[1-G(0)].  (13) 
Also,  from (6) and (7), for i =  1, 2, 
x;  -  H(w, O,,i)  dw -  yH(x,,  ;,i,)  =  riK  (14) 
1 -  H(xy,Ox;,i)  -  yh(x,Ol,,i)  =  0.  (15) 
Equations (11)-(15)  solve  for p, ri, Oi, and xi for i =  1, 2. 
3.2. THE  MODEL  U.S. ECONOMY 
Here I will treat the U.S.  economy  as simply  a scaled-up  version  of the 
Canadian economy.  Note  that in the model  summarized  by (11)-(15) the 
measure  of the Canadian population,  N, is irrelevant for the determina- 
tion of equilibrium  interest  rates and prices.  Let N* denote  the measure 
of the U.S. population,  which is on the order of O1N  for the period under 
study. 
Recall  that  two  important  differences  between  U.S.  and  Canadian 
monetary  and  banking  arrangements  during  1870-1913  are that (1) re- 
strictions  on  private  note  issue  in  the  United  States implied  that bank 
notes  could not be backed by private assets,  and (2) U.S. banks were for 
the  most  part unit banks,  which  could  not  diversify  to the  extent  that 
their Canadian counterparts  could. 
The first restriction can be captured in the model by simply closing off 
the issue  of notes  by  private  agents.  Type 2 lenders  are then  forced to 
hold  fiat money,  just  as U.S.  residents  who  wished  to hold  circulating 
notes  could  either  hold  U.S.  Treasury  notes  or  national  bank  notes 
backed  by  U.S.  government  bonds,  while  Canadian  residents  had  the 
option  of holding  large-denomination  private  circulating notes  backed 
by private loans. 
An extreme version  of the second  restriction, unit banking,  is a prohi- 
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more than one  investment  project. With this restriction,  financial inter- 
mediaries  have  no role in the model;  all lending  and borrowing  is done 
directly between  type  3 lenders  and entrepreneurs.  However,  this out- 
come  can  be  intepreted  as  a  banking  arrangement  where,  for  every 
funded  project,  there is one  bank with  K depositors.  Optimal contracts 
with  entrepreneurs  are debt  contracts,  as in the  case  without  the  unit 
banking  restriction  (Williamson  1986),  but  there  is  now  no  delegated 
monitoring.  If the  entrepreneur  (bank) defaults,  all K depositors  incur 
the verification  costs; that is,  the depositors  incur collective  verification 
costs  of Ky with  unit banking  and  y with  perfect diversification.  There- 
fore, for the unit banking system,  the expected  return to a bank's deposi- 
tors is 
7*(xt,0,0t)  =  xt -  f  H(w,O,  t) dw -  yKH(xt,O, t)  (16) 
fo 
where the asterisk (*) superscripts  denote  variables and functions for the 
U.S.  economy.  Given  (16), (14) and  (15) become,  for the U.S.  economy, 
(17) and (18): For i =  1, 2, 
x,  -  H(w, 0*,Oi) dw -  yKH(x'*, '*,  i)=  r*K  (17) 
1 -  H(x'*,  *,i)  -  yKh(X*,  *, ,i)  = 0.  (18) 
Given the restriction on private note issue,  instead  of (11), (12), and (13) 
the U.S.  economy  has (19), (20), and (21): 
nlA(ql+(1-ql)/p*)  +  '72 +  3[1  -F(r1-q1-(1-q1))/p*] 
-  P*{l1A(q2*+1-q2)  +  72 +  73[1-F(r2-q2p*-l+q2)]}  = 0  (19) 
3F(rA-q,-(1-q1)/p*)  =  74[1-  G(e*)]  (20) 
n3F(r2  -q2*-1+q2)  =  74[1- G(2*)]  (21) 
The differences  between  (11), (12), and (13), on the one hand,  and (19), 
(20), and (21), on the other, arise because  under the U.S. regime all type 
2 lenders  hold  fiat money  and none  of them contribute to the supply  of 
credit to entrepreneurs. 
For the U.S. economy,  (16)-(21)  determine p*  and x* , 0*, r*  for i = 1, 2. 
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ity. For a bank that lends  to an entrepreneur  with parameter 0 in period 
t, the  probability  of failure is Pr[w<xt ()],  where  xt(0) is the  promised 
payment  by the entrepreneur  which  satisfies 
7*(xt(0), O,4t) =  rtK.  (22) 
The number of banks that fail in period t +  1 is, then, 
Pt+,  = N*  H(xt0(),O,t)g(0) d0.  (23) 
Jt 
The contractual arrangement  with  unit banking can be interpreted  as 
involving  a bank run when  a bank failure occurs. That is, the verification 
cost,  y,  could  represent  the  cost  to a depositor  of  getting  to  the bank 
early to withdraw  her deposit.  On receiving  a signal at the beginning  of 
period  t +  1 that failure is imminent,  each depositor  incurs the cost of 
running  to the bank,  each  receives  less  than the promised  return, and 
the bank fails.  Runs  are never  observed  with  perfect diversification  by 
banks,  since  depositors  would  never  need  to verify  the  return on  the 
bank's portfolio. 
With this  interpretation  of bank failures and runs,  this model  seems 
better able to confront U.S. and Canadian experience  than the bank runs 
model of Diamond  and Dybvig (1983) or the related model of Postlewaite 
and  Vives  (1987).  These  other  models  rely on  inherent  features  of the 
deposit  contract to explain  runs,  which  leaves  the very different behav- 
ior of U.S. and Canadian banking  systems  unexplained. 
3.3 AGGREGATE  FLUCTUATIONS 
To analyze  fluctuations  in  the  two  model  economies  summarized  by 
(11)-(15)  and  (16)-(21),  I take  as  a benchmark  a stationary  monetary 
equilibrium with no fluctuations.  That is, let 4t = 0 for all t. Then, for the 
Canadian economy,  p =  1, r, = r2 = r, and 06 =  02 =  0'. Similarly, for the 
U.S. economy,  p* =  1, r  = r2 =  r*, and 0'* =  02  =  0'* 
The two  parallel economies  are subjected  to the same shocks,  with  Xl 
=  4 and  O2 >  4.  I study  the  behavior  of the  two  economies  for small 
perturbations;  that  is,  I  totally  differentiate  (11)-(15)  and  (16)-(21) 
around  the  benchmark  equilibrium.  In  particular,  I am  interested  in 
deriving  expressions  for unconditional  variances and covariances of key 
variables. As in Greenwood  and Williamson (1988), for two time series zt 
and z,  for which  zt = zi when  Ot =  fi for i, j = 1, 2, to find the covariance 
for a small  perturbation  to the benchmark  equilibrium,  a second-order 
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cov(at,  b)  -  [(l-ql)q2/2(1-ql +q)2]  [dzlld2-odz2l/O2]  [dz2/d2- dz2/2].  (24) 
Matters are somewhat  more complicated  for covariances of output  with 
other  key  variables.  Output,  Yt, for the  Canadian  economy  consists  of 
two  components.  The  first component,  denoted  y',  consists  of output 
produced  in period  t by lenders: 
Yt  =  N[Tq1A(Etpt+1/pt)+  7k+  q3].  (25) 
The  second  component,  y2  ,  is  the  output  produced  in period  t from 
investment  projects  funded  in period  t -  1. Let ui denote  the expected 
return on these  projects (which is invariant to changes  in 0).  Then 
Y2-1  =  Ng{Tq2B(rt- EtPt+l/Pt)+  713F(rt-  EtPt+lPt)}.  (26) 
Then,  for some  variable zt for which  zt = zi when  (t  =  pi, 
cov(zt,yt) -  [(1-q)q2/2(1-ql  +q2)2][azl/ad2-  az2/a42] 
x  [dyl/vd2-  dy2/Id2+(q1-q2)(dy1/d42-y922/42)].  (27) 
The unconditional  variance of output  is 
var(yt) -  [(1-ql)q2/2(1-q  +q2)2] 
x  [(d  Y1/02-  yI2/d2)2+2(q -q2)(dy]/d02-  dy2Id2) 
)2].  (28).  x  (dyI2/d2-22/dP2) + (Py/21a2-ayad2)2].  (28). 
The U.S.  economy  has  similar expressions  corresponding  to (25), (26), 
(27), and (28). 
For the Canadian economy,  I totally differentiate (11)-(15) and solve to 
get  the  following,  where  dt denotes  bank  deposits  and  nt the  stock  of 
private bank notes. 
ad/la  -  ad2/la2  >  0 
anl/a02 -  an2/la2  >  0 
a/a02  < 0 
dyl/d2  -  y2I/dP2  >  0 
8dY11d2  - dy22/d2  >  .- 322 *  WILLIAMSON 
Similarly, for the U.S.  economy: 
ddo/d92  -  ddoI42  >  0 
0p*/ia2 <  0 
o'/(?2 
- 
2*Ilda2  >  0 
0Y/d0k2  -  dY2/J19  >  0. 
(For the details of these  derivations,  see Appendix  A.) 
Fluctuations  in the two economies  are, therefore, qualitatively similar. 
In both  countries,  bank  liabilities  (bank  notes  plus  deposits)  and  the 
price level (the inverse  of the price of fiat money)  are procyclical. Thus, if 
both economies  are subjected to the same real disturbances,  they experi- 
ence business  cycles that move in phase.  The mean-preserving  spread in 
the distribution  of returns on investment  projects that occurs in state 2 
can be  thought  of as a decrease  in the  demand  for credit.  This distur- 
bance causes  the real interest rate, r, and the quantity of credit extended 
by intermediaries  to fall in state 2 relative to state 1. This credit decrease 
is matched  by a decrease  in the  quantity  of bank liabilities,  so that the 
demand  for fiat money  rises and the price level falls. Output tends to be 
higher in state 1 than in state 2 for two reasons.  One is that the expected 
real rate of  return  on  fiat money  is higher  in state  1,  so lenders  work 
more  and  consume  less  leisure.  The other reason  for higher  output  in 
state 1 is that, since the shock 4t is positively  serially correlated, a period 
with a high quantity of credit extended  is followed  by state 1 with higher 
probability  than  by  state  2.  Thus,  output  from  the  previous  period's 
investment,  yt2_, tends  to be higher in state 1 than in state 2. 
From (23), there are two effects on fluctuations  in bank failures. First, 
the number of failures tends to be larger in state 2 because entrepreneurs 
with  the  same  characteristics  (the same  0) who  receive  loans  in state  1 
and  state 2 face a higher  promised  payment,  x:0),  in state 2, the  state 
where  investment  projects are riskier. Therefore,  the probability of fail- 
ure for banks  funding  projects  of the  same  quality is higher  in state 2. 
Second,  since 0* is higher in state 1 than in state 2, the average quality of 
projects  (without  taking account  of the change  in riskiness)  is lower  in 
state 1. This tends  to make the number of failures larger in state 1 than in 
state 2. The first effect tends  to induce  countercyclical bank failures; the 
second  effect,  procyclical  bank failures.  It seems  reasonable  to assume 
that the first effect  dominates,  so that bank failures are countercyclical, 
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The next  step  is to make a quantitative  comparison  of fluctuations  in 
the two  economies.  For this purpose,  consider  economies  where  y =  0 
and r2  =  0, that is, where  verification is costless,  making intermediation 
irrelevant, and where there is zero demand for private bank notes. There- 
fore, the two restrictions  that make the two economies  different are not 
binding.  The two economies  then produce  the same benchmark steady- 
state equilibrium and the same unconditional  variances and covariances 
of key variables (in per capita terms). In Appendix  A, let a = a*, b = b*,  f 
f,  g  =  g*,  A  =  A*,  B  =  B*, F  =  F*, L0 =  0,  and  X  =  X;.  Further, 
assume  that B(r-1)  = 0 in the steady-state  equilibrium with y = 0 and 72 
=0. 
Now,  to see  what  effects  the unit banking restriction and the prohibi- 
tion of private bank notes  have  on unconditional  variances and covari- 
ances, differentiate equations  (A1)-(A9)  in Appendix  A with respect to K 
and  72 and  evaluate  at y  =  0 and  72 =  0. This results  in the following 
(which is detailed  in Appendix  B): 
dK [(adl/aO2)/N-(ad2/da2)N--(dd*/Id2)/N*  + (dd*d  2)/N*]  >  0 
-  [(ad/1aO2)/N-(ad2/142)/N-  (ad*/42)/N*+  (dd*2/d2)/N*]  < 0 
dq2 
dK [(ad/a4,2)/N-  (ad2/a2)/N +  (anj/4,2)/N-  (an2/la2)/N  dK 
-(\dd l/d2)/N* + (dd  2/Id2)/N*] >  0 
d  [(ad,/aO2)/N-(ad2/laO)/N  +  (dn,l/d2)/N-  (n2/1a2)/N 
drq2 
-(ddl/do2)/N* + (ddd/,2)/N*]  >  0 
dK[(dy2Id2)/N-  (d2Y/-a(2)/N-  (y2/42)/N*+  (dyf /a2)/N*]  >  0 
d[(yd/a42)/N-  (/d42)/N-  (dya  /2)/N*+  (d*/a2)/N*]  >  0 
d  (p/2P9/2)  >  / 
K (la/a^|-|a*/a  |21)  > o 324 *  WILLIAMSON 
p(Ic  Wl-laWzll  > o 
d 
dK-[(Nl/or2)  /N-(t  lo2)IN-(a  l*/a,c2)/N*+ (oyd*/  dse2)/N*]  >  0 
a  [(dyl?Nk2)/N-  (42Ia2)IN-(dy1*Ia42)IN*+  (dy2  I*d2)IN*I >  0. 
Therefore,  the  effect  of  each  restriction  (considered  separately)  is  to 
make  per  capita bank  liabilities,  per capita output,  and  the  price level 
less  variable.  Though  the unit banking  restriction makes bank deposits 
less  variable,  deposits  become  more variable with  a prohibition  on pri- 
vate note issue. 
Some partial equilibrium  intuition  may clarify the forces that produce 
these results.  Ignoring the dynamic effects from movements  in the price 
level,  think of the model  in terms of credit supply  and demand,  where 
the competitively  determined  price is the interest rate r. In Figure 2, the 
credit demand  curve,  Do, is  determined  by  the  number  of investment 
projects  which,  if funded,  will  yield  a return per lender  of  at least  r. 
Credit supply  is determined  by the number of lenders who hold interme- 
diary liabilities for each r. With perfectly diversified banks and no prohi- 
bition  on  bank  note  issue,  an  increase  in  the  riskiness  of  investment 
projects  shifts  the  demand  curve  to  Do, since  fewer  projects  are now 
creditworthy  for each r. As a result,  r, the quantity of projects financed, 
and output  (in the subsequent  period) fall. With the imposition  of a unit 
banking system,  the credit demand  curve becomes  less elastic. That is, in 
the  event  of default  by  an entrepreneur,  verification  costs  incurred by 
lenders  are now  yK rather than  K, so  that  expected  verification  costs 
increase more rapidly as the quality of investment  projects (0) decreases. 
An  increase  in  riskiness  for all projects  thus  shifts  D,  to  D',  and  the 
change in quantity and price is smaller than with perfect diversification. 
Figure 3 shows  the effect of a prohibition  on private bank notes.  The 
supply of credit becomes  less elastic, and So  shifts to S1, since agents who 
would otherwise  be holding intermediated  assets instead hold unproduc- 
tive fiat currency. When  risk increases  for all projects, shifting  Do to Do, 
the  quantity  of  credit  falls  less  than  it  would  have  otherwise.  Thus, 
credit,  bank  liabilities,  and  output  are more  volatile  when  bank  note 
issue  is permitted. 
In the model,  disturbances  that make credit more volatile also tend to 
make prices more volatile  since,  with  a fixed nominal  stock of currency, Figures  2 and  3 THE EFFECTS OF TWO  RESTRICTIONS ON  PROJECT RISK- 
INDUCED  FLUCTUATIONS IN THE CREDIT MARKET 
Figure 2 UNIT BANKING  RESTRICTION 
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the  price level  equates  the  supply  of and  the  demand  for fiat money. 
When bank note issue  is permitted,  bank deposits  tend to be less volatile 
because  the  interest  rate is less  volatile  and because  price movements 
induce  more substitution  into fiat currency from deposits. 
The  fact  that  the  unit  banking  restriction  induces  less  volatility  in 
aggregate  activity is perhaps  surprising.  In the model U.S. unit banking 
economy,  we observe  countercyclical bank failures. Relaxing this restric- 
tion in the  model  makes  bank failures  a constant  (that is,  zero).  Thus, 
intuition  might  tell us  that aggregate  volatility  should  be smaller in the 
economy  with  perfectly  diversified  banks.  The  model  contradicts  this 
intuition  and  seems  also to be at odds  with  the views  of Friedman and 
Schwartz  (1963), Bernanke  (1983), and  Hamilton  (1987). Friedman and 
Schwartz assign an important macroeconomic  role to bank failures in the 
United  States  during  the  Great Depression,  a role they  think operated 
through  reductions  in  measured  monetary  aggregates.  Bernanke  and 
Hamilton  argue  that bank failures in the  Great Depression  had  effects 
other than  those  reflected  in monetary  aggregates.  However,  note  that 
both Bernanke (1983, pp. 266-67)  and Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 
352-53)  have difficulty reconciling  their views  with the Canadian experi- 
ence in the Great Depression.  During this time,  Canada and the United 
States  experienced  comparable  declines  in  output,  but  no  Canadian 
banks failed (Haubrich 1987). 
3.4. DEPOSIT  INSURANCE 
Government  deposit  insurance  programs have played an important role 
in  discussions  of banking  instability,  as for example,  in Diamond  and 
Dybvig  (1983). Such a program can be introduced  into the unit banking 
system  as  follows.  Assume  that  the  government  is  an  agent  that can 
supply  effort to monitor  entrepreneurs.  The government  guarantees  all 
bank  depositors  a  certain  return  in  each  period.  If a  bank  fails,  the 
government  verifies  the return on the bank's portfolio. Lump-sum taxes 
are levied,  either on banks or on depositors,  which  are just sufficient to 
compensate  depositors  in failed banks  and  to compensate  the  govern- 
ment for effort expended  in monitoring  banks.  This arrangement yields 
an  equilibrium  allocation  identical  to  the  one  achieved  with  perfectly 
diversified  banks. 
Canadian and U.S.  banking  and monetary  arrangements  since World 
War II can be viewed  as equivalent.  In 1935, private bank note issue was 
prohibited  in  Canada,  with  the  establishment  of the  Bank of  Canada, 
and Canadian banks were,  if anything,  larger and more well-diversified 
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as accomplishing  a function  similar to that of a well-diversified  banking 
system;  the  only  difference  is  that  in  the  U.S.  system  monitoring  is 
delegated  partly to the government  rather than entirely to private finan- 
cial  intermediaries.  The  model  constructed  here,  then,  predicts  that, 
other  things  held  constant,  aggregate  fluctuations  should  have  similar 
properties  across the two countries  in the postwar period. 
4. The  Evidence 
4.1. COMPARISON  OF CANADIAN  AND U.S. AGGREGATE  DATA 
Now  let us  examine  annual  aggregate  data for Canada and  the United 
States  for  the  periods  1870-1913  and  1954-87  and  look  for  evidence 
consistent  or inconsistent  with  the theory in Section 3. 
The aggregate  data come  from several  sources.  Urquhart (1986) con- 
structed constant  dollar Canadian GNP and implicit price deflator series 
for  1870-1913.  Urquhart  used  a value-added  method  to  assemble  the 
GNP  data,  and  the  resulting  series  seems  to be of considerably  better 
quality than anything  available for the United States for this period.  For 
U.S.  constant  dollar  GNP  in  1870-1913,  I use  two  alternative  series, 
constructed  by Romer (1989) and Balke and Gordon (1989) using  similar 
regression  methods,  but different underlying  data. These series seem to 
be the best existing  measures  of U.S. GNP for this period. The two series 
have  similar low  frequency  properties,  but their cyclical properties  are 
different.  For implicit  price  deflators  for  1870-1913,  I use  a  standard 
historical  series  from  Balke and  Gordon  (1986) and  an updated  series 
from  Balke and  Gordon  (1989).  Data  on  chartered  bank  deposits  and 
bank notes  in  circulation  in  Canada  in  1870-1913  come  from monthly 
statements  by  the  chartered  banks,  published  in  the  Canada Year  Book 
(1915).  U.S.  commercial  bank  deposit  data  are  from  Friedman  and 
Schwartz (1970). The U.S. banking data are also inferior to the Canadian 
data,  since  the  U.S.  series  was  constructed  from national banks' infre- 
quent call reports and from very poor state bank data. For 1954-87,  data 
come from the CANSIM data base,  the Federal Reserve Board data base, 
and the FDIC Annual Report  (various issues). 
All  time  series  were  subjected  to  a  log  transformation  and  were 
detrended  using  a Hodrick-Prescott  filter (Prescott 1983), which  essen- 
tially  fits  a  smooth,  time-varying  trend  to  the  data.5 Multiplying  the 
resulting  series by 100 gives  time series which  are percentage  deviations 
5. Here I set A, the parameter  which governs the smoothness in the trend, to 400. An 
increase  in A  makes the trend smoother.  Prescott  (1983)  uses A = 1600  for  quarterly  data. 328 *  WILLIAMSON 
from trend. The theory yields  predictions  about unconditional  variances 
and covariances  of per capita aggregates  in economies  that do not grow. 
Thus,  the  data  transformations  account  as  well  as  seems  possible  for 
differences  between  the  two  countries  in  long-run  growth,  scale,  and 
population. 
Tables 3 and  4  show  correlation  matrices  for percentage  deviations 
from  the  trend  of  the  Canadian  and  U.S.  data  in  1870-1913.  Table 5 
Tables  3-5  CORRELATIONS  OF PERCENTAGE  DEVIATIONS  FROM  TREND 
IN 1870-1913  DATA 
Table  3  CANADIAN MATRIX 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (3)+(4) 
Gross  Implicit  Bank  Bank  Bank 
National  Price  Deposits  Notes  Liabilities 
Product  Deflator  (deflated) (deflated)  (deflated) 
(1)  1.000  .475  .433  .717  .588 
(2)  1.000  -.026  .522  .182 
(3)  1.000  .491  .941 
(4)  1.000  .748 
(3)+(4)  1.000 
Table 4  U.S.  MATRIX 
(2)  (3)  (4) 
(1)  GNP  Implicit  Bank 
GNP  (Balke  &  Price  Deflator  Deposits 
(Romer)  Gordon)  (standard)  (deflated) 
(1)  1.000  .691  .183  .217 
(2)  1.000  .502  .523 
(3)  1.000  .494 
(4)  1.000 
Table 5  CROSS-COUNTRY CORRELATIONS 
U.  S./Canada 
Indicator  Correlation 
GNP  With Romer's Data  .395 
With Balke  & Gordon's  Data  .678 
Implicit  Price  Deflator  .677 
U.S. Bank Deposits/Canadian  Bank Notes  + Deposits  .518 
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shows  cross-country  correlations.  See  also Figure 4. Tables 3 and 4 are 
generally  consistent  with  the theory  in that all but one  of the series are 
mutually  positively  correlated  in  both  countries.  In addition,  Table 5 
shows  a high  degree  of correlation between  corresponding  variables in 
the two countries.  This is consistent  with the assumption  that real distur- 
bances common  to both countries  dominate  over this period. 
Tables 6, 7, and 8 show  correlations for the period 1954-87  and corre- 
spond  to Tables 3,  4,  and  5.  See  also  Figure 5. Tables 6 and  7 indicate 
some  inconsistencies  with  the  model:  in  the  Canadian  data,  there  is 
essentially  no  correlation between  GNP and the price level,  and in the 
U.S.  data, the GNP/price  level  and price level/bank  deposit  correlations 
are negative.  Also,  in  Table 8,  U.S.  and  Canadian  bank  deposits  are 
negatively  correlated.  There thus  appear to be important factors affect- 
ing aggregate  fluctuations  in Canada and the United  States in the later 
period that are not captured in the model.  Care is needed,  therefore,  in 
interpreting the 1954-87  data and in comparing the later period with the 
earlier one. 
Table 9 shows  standard  deviations  of the transformed  series for each 
Figure  4 PERCENTAGE  DEVIATIONS  FROM  TREND  OF U.S. AND 
CANADIAN GNP IN 1870-1913 
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time  period,  ratios  of  these  volatility  measures  for  Canada  and  the 
United  States  for each  period,  and volatility  ratios for the two  periods. 
Perhaps the strongest  evidence  supporting  the predictions  of the model 
is in the volatility  measures  for the GNP data from both periods.  From 
column  (1), Canadian GNP is considerably  more volatile than U.S. GNP 
for the period  1870-1913.  Volatility is 56 percent  greater using  Romer's 
GNP data, and  11 percent  greater using  Balke and Gordon's.  For 1954- 
87, GNP volatility is virtually identical in the two countries, as the theory 
predicts.  See also Figures 4 and 5 for a visual representation. 
In column  (1) of Table 9,  as is  consistent  with  the  model,  Canadian 
prices  are more  volatile  than  U.S.  prices  for  1870-1913,  by  9 percent 
Tables  6-8  CORRELATIONS  OF PERCENTAGE  DEVIATIONS  FROM  TREND 
IN 1954-1987  DATA 
Table  6  CANADIAN  MATRIX 
(2)  (3) 
Implicit  Bank 
(1)  Price  Deposits 
GNP  Deflator  (deflated) 
(1)  GNP  1.000  -.023  .320 
(2)  Implicit  Price  Deflator  1.000  .594 
(3)  Bank Deposits  (deflated)  1.000 
Table  7  U.S. MATRIX 
(2)  (3) 
Implicit  Bank 
(1)  Price  Deposits 
GNP  Deflator  (Deflated) 
(1)  GNP  1.000  -.528  .483 
(2)  Implicit  Price  Deflator  1.000  -.588 
(3)  Bank  Deposits (deflated)  1.000 
Table  8  CROSS-COUNTRY  CORRELATIONS 
U.  S./Canada 
Indicator  Correlation 
GNP  .607 
Implicit  Price  Deflator  .935 
Bank  Deposits (deflated)  -.133 
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using the standard U.S. GNP deflator and by 54 percent using Balke and 
Gordon's.  However,  in column  (2) of Table 9, the Canadian GNP deflator 
is 21 percent more volatile than the U.S. GNP deflator in 1954-87,  which 
is inconsistent  with  the theory. 
Returning again to column  (1), note  that in the early period Canadian 
bank deposits  are less  volatile  than  U.S.  bank deposits  (deflated  using 
either  the  standard  GNP  deflator  or Balke and  Gordon's).  This is not 
inconsistent  with  the  theory  since  the prohibition  of bank notes  makes 
deposits  more  volatile  in the  model.  Canada's  bank note  circulation is 
considerably  more  volatile  than  its  bank  deposits.  But bank  note  and 
deposit  liabilities  in Canada  are less  volatile  than bank deposits  in the 
United  States-by  approximately  12 percent  using  the  standard  U.S. 
GNP deflator  and by 21 percent  using  Balke and  Gordon's  deflator. In 
the  1870-1913  period,  this  is  where  the  theory  has  the  most  trouble 
explaining  the data. However,  note that, in column (2), U.S. bank depos- 
its are also  more  volatile  than  Canadian  bank  deposits  in the  1954-87 
period.  Column  (3) shows  ratios for the  two  periods  of the  Canadian/ 
U.S. bank liability volatility ratios, that is, the relative volatility between 
Figure  5 PERCENTAGE  DEVIATIONS  FROM  TREND  OF U.S. AND 
CANADIAN GNP IN 1954-1987 
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the two  periods.  This relative volatility  measure  is higher for U.S. bank 
liabilities,  approximately  2 percent  using  the  standard GNP deflator or 
12 percent  using  Balke and  Gordon's  deflator. Additionally,  the theory 
could be reconciled  with  the data if the U.S. bank deposit  data for 1870- 
1913 contained  considerably  more  measurement  error than  the  corre- 
sponding  Canadian data. As noted  earlier, this seems  a good possibility. 
4.2. INDUSTRIAL  COMPOSITION  OF CANADIAN AND U.S. OUTPUT  FOR 
1870-1913 
A possible  alternative  explanation  for the  difference  in the volatility  of 
GNP in Canada and the United States in 1870-1913 is that production in 
Canada was  more  concentrated  in industries  which  had high volatility. 
For example,  one might  suppose  that a larger fraction of Canadian GNP 
consisted  of production  of primary commodities  which would  tend to be 
more  cyclically  sensitive  than  production  in  other  industries.  To see 
whether  the  empirical  evidence  supports  this  alternative  hypothesis, 
Table  9  VOLATILITY  OF PERCENTAGE  DEVIATIONS  FROM  TREND  IN 
TWO  COUNTRIES  AND TWO  PERIODS 
Standard  Deviation 
(1)  (2) 
Country  and  Indicator  1870-1913  1954-1987  (1)-(2) 
Canada 
GNP  4.87  2.51  1.94 
Implicit  Price  Deflator  3.84  4.42  .87 
Bank Notes  9.22 
Deposits  4.96  4.69  1.06 
Liabilities  (Notes + Deposits)  5.26  4.69  1.12 
United  States 
GNP (Romer)  3.13  2.57  1.22 
(Balke  & Gordon)  4.37  2.57  1.70 
Implicit  Price  Deflator (standard)  3.53  3.66  .96 
(Balke  & Gordon)  2.49  3.66  .68 
Bank  Deposits (standard  deflator)  5.96  5.20  1.15 
(Balke  & Gordon deflator)  6.64  5.20  1.28 
Canada  +  United  States 
GNP (Romer)  1.56  .98  1.59 
(Balke  & Gordon)  1.11  .98  1.13 
Implicit  Price  Deflator (standard)  1.09  1.21  .90 
(Balke  & Gordon)  1.54  1.21  1.27 
Bank  Liabilities  (standard  deflator)  .88  .90  .98 
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let's examine  comparable  value-added  data for selected  U.S.  and Cana- 
dian industries. 
Gallman  (1960) has  constructed  value-added  measures  for four U.S. 
industries,  at five-year intervals,  which  overlap with our sample  for the 
years  1874,  1879,  . ...  ,  1899. Urquhart (1986) provides  comparable  an- 
nual data for Canada. The four industries  are agriculture, mining,  manu- 
facturing,  and  construction,  and  the  value-added  measures  are in cur- 
rent Canadian  dollars.  For Canada,  these  four industries  accounted  for 
60 percent of gross domestic  product in 1889. Table 10 shows  the percent- 
age  of  value  added  in  each  of  the  four industries  in  Canada  and  the 
United States for the selected  years. As anticipated,  Canada had a larger 
portion  of output  in agriculture and a smaller portion in manufacturing 
than  the  United  States  did,  and  this  difference  persists  through  the 
sample.  The  portion  of value  added  in mining  was  smaller in Canada 
than  in  the  United  States  through  most  of  the  period,  but  Canada's 
portion  was  slightly  larger than  the  United  States'  in  1894 and  much 
larger in 1899. However,  this 1899 number was temporarily enlarged by 
the Klondike  gold  rush  (Urquhart 1986). The portion of value  added  in 
construction  was  consistently  much  smaller  in  Canada  than  in  the 
United States. 
Using  the  same  detrending  method  as described  above,  I computed 
standard deviations  of percentage  deviations  from trend for current dol- 
lar value-added  measures  for the four Canadian industries in 1870-1913. 
These  statistics  are  displayed  in  Table 11.  Surprisingly,  volatility  was 
lowest  in agriculture,  followed  by manufacturing  and mining,  with  the 
Table  10  PERCENTAGE  OF VALUE  ADDED  IN FOUR  CANADIAN  AND 
U.S. INDUSTRIES 
(Based  on current  Canadian  dollar  data) 
Industry  and  Country 
Manufactur- 
Agriculture  Mining  ing  Construction 
Year  Canada  U.S.  Canada  U.S.  Canada  U.S.  Canada  U.S. 
1874  51.6  46.9  1.6  2.8  36.1  38.4  10.7  12.0 
1879  59.1  49.0  2.0  2.9  32.4  37.0  6.5  11.1 
1884  49.5  40.0  1.7  2.8  37.9  43.0  10.9  14.2 
1889  46.8  35.1  2.7  3.6  41.5  47.4  9.0  13.9 
1894  48.9  33.8  4.1  3.7  41.1  46.0  6.0  16.6 
1899  44.9  33.3  8.2  4.6  40.2  49.5  6.8  12.6 
Note: Percentages  may not add up to 100 due  to rounding. 
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highest  volatility  in construction.  Given the evidence  from Table 10, the 
differences in the composition  of output in Canada and the United States 
would  tend  to  make  Canadian  output  less  volatile  in  the  1870-1913 
period.  As an additional  check,  a counterfactual nominal GNP series for 
Canada for 1870-1913  was constructed.  This was done as follows.  Let Yt 
denote  nominal  GNP, Yi nominal  value added in industry i, where  i =  1, 
2, 3, 4 for agriculture,  mining,  manufacturing,  and construction,  respec- 
tively. An  asterisk  (*) superscript  denotes  a U.S.  variable. Then,  coun- 
terfactual Canadian  nominal  GNP, Yt (what Canadian GNP would  have 
been  if Canada had had the same  relative composition  of output  as the 
United  States in agriculture,  mining,  manufacturing,  and construction), 
is computed  as 
4  4 
Yt =  Yt -  t +  aYit 
i=1  i=1 
The weights,  ai for i =  1, 2, 3, 4 were constructed  as follows: 
4  4 
tit=  (yY  /  Y)I(Yil  Yis) 
i=i  i=l 
where  s =  1874 for t =  1870,  .  .  ,1876;  s =  1879 for t =  1877,  .  .  , 1881; 
s =  1884 for t =  1882,  ..  .,  1886; s =  1889 for t =  1887, ...  ,1891;  s = 
1894 for t =  1892,  .  .  .,  1896; and  s  =  1899 for t =  1897,  .  .  .,  1913.  The 
standard deviation  of percentage  deviations  from trend in Yt  is 7.53, and 
for Yt it is  7.54.  This  evidence  provides  no  support  for the  alternative 
hypothesis  that  historical  cross-country  differences  in volatility  can be 
explained  by differences  in the composition  of output. 
The  relative  industry  volatilities  in  Table 11 would  probably  not  be 
very different  if the value-added  measures  were based on constant  dol- 
Table  11  VOLATILITY  OF PERCENTAGE  DEVIATIONS  FROM  TREND  OF 
VALUE  ADDED  IN FOUR  CANADIAN  INDUSTRIES  1870-1913 
(Based  on Current  Canadian  dollar  data) 
Industry  Standard  Deviation 
Agriculture  8.2 
Mining  13.8 
Manufacturing  11.7 
Construction  18.4 
Sum of Above Four  Industries  9.0 
Source of raw data: Urquhart (1986) Restrictions  on Finanical  Intermediaries  *  335 
lar data.  (Urquhart  1986 uses  an  aggregate  price  index  to  deflate  his 
aggregate  current  dollar  GNP  measures.)  For example,  if  agricultural 
prices  were  more  volatile  than  other  prices,  and  if these  prices  were 
procyclical, as was true for aggregate price indices over this period,  then 
agricultural output  would  tend to be relatively less volatile than in Table 
11. 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
The  aim  of  this  paper  was  to  adapt  a macroeconomic  model  with  an 
explicit financial intermediation  structure to capture financial and mone- 
tary arrangements  in the United  States and Canada in the period  1870- 
1913, to analyze  the  model's  implications  for aggregate  fluctuations  in 
the two countries,  and to see whether  these implications appear to fit the 
facts. Over this period,  Canada had a branch banking system,  with  few 
banks compared  to the U.S. unit banking system.  Canadian banks could 
issue  circulating notes  with  no restrictions on their backing,  while  U.S. 
banks could not issue notes backed by private assets.  Canada also experi- 
enced  considerably  less  disruption  due to bank failures than the United 
States did, and banking  panics were virtually nonexistent  in Canada. 
The model  predicts that, with a unit banking restriction, output,  price 
level,  and bank liabilities become  less volatile than they would  be other- 
wise,  because  the restriction causes the demand  for credit to become less 
elastic in the face of technological  shocks  affecting credit demand.  This 
occurs  despite  the  fact  that  bank  failures  and  bank  runs  are  coun- 
tercyclical in the unit banking economy,  and the fact that there would  be 
no  such  failures  and  runs  in an economy  where  banks  could  diversify 
perfectly, as in a branch banking  system  in a large economy.  The model 
also predicts that a prohibition  on circulating bank notes reduces volatil- 
ity in bank liabilities,  output,  and prices.  Deposit  insurance  in the unit 
banking  system  is an equivalent  arrangement  to a perfectly  diversified 
banking system,  so that Canada and the United States should experience 
similar fluctuations  after World War II, everything  else held constant. 
With regard to its qualitative predictions  for co-movements,  the model 
is  consistent  with  aggregate  annual  data for the  1870-1913  period  for 
Canada  and  the  United  States.  However,  the  model  runs  into  some 
problems in 1954-87: U.S. and Canadian prices are countercyclical rather 
than procyclical as the model  predicts. 
Relative volatilities  in U.S.  and Canadian GNP in the two periods  are 
most  supportive  of  the  model.  Depending  on  the  U.S.  GNP  measure 
used,  Canadian GNP is 56 percent or 11 percent more volatile than U.S. 
GNP  in  1870-1913.  Volatility is virtually  equal  in the  two  countries  in 336 *  WILLIAMSON 
1954-87.  Also consistent  with the model is the greater volatility in Cana- 
dian  prices  for 1870-1913.  However,  for 1870-1913,  Canadian  bank li- 
abilities are less volatile than U.S. bank liabilities, in contrast to what the 
model  predicts.  This  result  is  consistent  with  greater volatility  in true 
Canadian  bank  liabilities  coupled  with  greater  measurement  error in 
measured  U.S.  bank liabilities.  This possibility  seems  likely, since Cana- 
dian bank liabilities were measured  with greater frequency and accuracy 
for the 1870-1913  period. 
APPENDIX  A 
DERIVATION  OF VARIANCES  AND COVARIANCES  WITH  FLUCTUATIONS 
For the Canadian economy,  totally differentiate (11)-(15) and solve to get 
ad/la<2  -  d2/a02 =  Nrafr4Kg.X[(l-q1+q2)rla+  71A  +r72(1-B) 
+r'3(1-F)]V  (Al) 
anl/db2 -  an2/la2  =  72b(adl/ab2-ad2/la2)/Yf  (A2) 
dp/d2  =  -(rq2b+f  ) 714Kg9,,/V (A3) 
oy/oa2  -  /oc2  =  -Nr1la(1-q1+q2)dp/^2  (A4) 
dY/a4,2  -  2/adk2  = N1,(add/ad2- ad2/2  +  dnl/d2 -dn2/d2)  (A5) 
V-=  I,(7b-  77f)[(1  -ql +q2)>la+rlA+  r72(1-B)+  3(1  -F)] 
+  )4K2g[(1  -q,+q2)(nla+n2b+3f)+n,A+,l2(-B)+n3(l-F)]  >  0 
=  -  x D2H(.,0',  0) dw -  yD2H(x',  O',)  >  0 
Jo 
,=  [-  D3H(w, ',  ) dw > 
g  g('),  a  a(),  b  b(r-1),  f  f (r-1), 
A =  A(1), B =  B(r-1),  F =  F(r-l). Restrictions  on Finanical  Intermediaries  *  337 
Similarly, for the U.S.  economy: 
0dd*/2  -  dd2/142  =  N*  3ffr4Kg*Z;[(l-q1+q2)qla*+q1A+7q2+7q3 
(1-F)]/V*  (A6) 
ap*/a  02  =-  -T3fq4Kg*  /'V*  (A7) 
o*/002 
- 
y*/I42  =  -N*,1a*(1-q1  +q2)Qpl*/2  (A8) 
eyI2  /  2-  dY912  = N*,[add/a02-dd/Ia02]  (A9) 
^V*  =  L1,,  [(1 -q-q2)  71a*+  71A*  + 7  /2  +  73(1 -F*)] 
+  74K2g*  [(1 -  qi + q2)(n7la*  + 7q)f+  7l A* +  2+n3(1  -F*)]  >  0 
-  -f  D2H(w,O'*,4) dw -  yKD2H(x'*,0'*,0) >  0 
Jo 
fx  O  D3H(w,O'*,0) dw >  0. 
APPENDIX  B 
COMPARISON  OF VARIANCES  AND COVARIANCES  ACROSS  COUNTRIES 
Differentiating  (A1)-(A9)  with respect to y and 7)2 and evaluating  at y = 
0,  72  = 0 gives 
K [(ad1/a42)N-  (d2laO2)/N-(dd/ao2)/N*+  (d/la42)/N*] 
=  rl3f774Kg,,D2H(x',0',0)(1-K)[q1ja(1  -q1+q2)+  )A+q3(1 -F)]2/V2 > 
o  (B1) 
_2 [(2d/a2)/N-  (dd2  2)/N- (dl/O2)/N*-(d (2/aO2)/N*I] 
=  -  qf4KgZ,Xb{[(1  -q1 +q2))1l  a + 7lA+ 7)3(1  -F)]  ,+  r74K2g(1  - q  +q2)}/  72 
<  0  (B2) 
dK [(ad1,/92)/N- (ad2/2)/NN+ (an1/la2)/N-  (na72aO2)/N 
-(add/a02)/N* +  (dd2/aC02)/N*] 
=  7)J4KgX,D2H(x',O',0)(1 -K)[,)1a(1-q1+q2)+A+  7)3(1  -F)]2/12  > 
0  (B3) 
o-5 [(9d1/922)/N-  (ad2/92)/N+  (a)q/l12)/N-  (an2/a2)/N 
-  (dlI/a02)/N*+ (dd2/902)/N*] 
=  74K3g2Z,b7l)a(1-q1  +q2)[7l1a(l-q +q2)+ 71A+  73(1-F)]  >  0  (B4) 338 - WILLIAMSON 
d#  [(ayIa402)/N-0(dy2/a02)/N-(ay2*Ia42)!N*?+  (dY2*/a4)2)/N*I 
/L973f)4Kg-OXD2H(x,  O',O)(1  -K)[71a(1  -q1  +q2)+ 7),A+  7)3(1-F)]2  17 > 
o  (B5) 
-7  [(dya42)/N-  (dyP/a(k2)/2)/N*+(  (  a42)/N*] 
= Ctr~K3g2X,1-b7)la(  -ql +q2)[7)1a(1  -ql+q2)+  7),A+ 7)3(1-F)] >  0  (B6) 
,  2  ( 1apa  a2j2- 1a*/P&I) 
=  774Kg.(7)3f)D2HD(x', 0',)(1-K)[q1la(1  -ql  +q2)+  7)1A+ 713(1-F)/V/  > 
o  (B7) 
-~'7  (Ia/a21-aP*/a21) 
=74Kgl  ,b[7la(l-ql1-q2)+7),A+  73(1-F)]/  12>  0  (B8) 
[(dyo/{dD/N-  (8y:/842)IN- (dyI*la02)/N*  + (8y:*/a/2)IN*I 
=  7)1a(l-1ql+q2)4Kggm ()3,f)2D2H(x',',4)(1  -K) 
x  [7l1a(l-q1+q2)+  ,A+7)3(1-F)]IV2 >  0  (B9) 
~? [(dY:I/a2)/N-  (dy:/a~2)-42)IN-  ((yi*/a42)j/N* + (y2*/  )IN] 
=71a(1 -ql  +q2)7)4Kglb[7)la(l  -i2tql  +q2)  + 71A,+ 7)3(1-F)]!17  >  0.  (B10) 
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Comment 
MARK  GERTLER 
University  of Wisconsin  and  NBER 
This paper nicely and elegantly  illustrates several basic points regarding 
the relation between  financial structure and real activity. First, it empha- 
sizes  the  simultaneous  nature  of  this  relation.  Second,  it provides  an- 
other example  of how  financial factors can propagate  business  fluctua- 
tions. And third, it demonstrates  how the regulation of financial markets 
can have important real consequences. 
The macroeconomic  model  presented  here evolves  explicitly from first 
principles.  What makes  financial  structure determinant  and relevant is 
the presence  of informational asymmetries  between  borrowers and lend- 
ers.  As  the  finance  literature  suggests,  these  asymmetries  introduce 
agency problems which ultimately add costs to borrowing. A determinant 
financial pattern emerges  because  it is optimal to structure financial con- 
tracts and institutions  to minimize  these  costs.  One may view  this paper 
and  other  related  work  in macroeconomics  as fleshing  out  the general 
equilibrium consequences  of having these kinds of agency costs present. 
The  specific  agency  framework  at the  core  of  the  analysis  is  Town- 
send's  (1979) costly  state verification  model.  Lenders  cannot  freely ob- 
serve a borrower's  project returns.  To do  so,  they  must  pay fixed cost. 
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principles.  What makes  financial  structure determinant  and relevant is 
the presence  of informational asymmetries  between  borrowers and lend- 
ers.  As  the  finance  literature  suggests,  these  asymmetries  introduce 
agency problems which ultimately add costs to borrowing. A determinant 
financial pattern emerges  because  it is optimal to structure financial con- 
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This creates  a problem:  If lenders  do  not  audit,  the  borrower  has  the 
incentive  to underreport  her earnings,  but it is inefficient  for lenders  to 
audit all the time. Under a certain set of restrictions, the optimal financial 
contract  assumes  the  following  form:  Whenever  project  output  w  is 
greater than  or equal  to a value  x,  lenders  receive  x and  the borrower 
gets  w  -  x.  When  w  is  below  x,  the  borrower  declares  default  and 
lenders audit. Lenders get w -  y, where  y is the verification cost, and the 
borrower gets  nothing.  The non-default  payment  x is chosen  to guaran- 
tee that lenders  receive an expected  return equal to the opportunity  cost 
of their funds. 
The optimal arrangement  is interpretable as a risky debt contract, with 
y being the cost of default.  Intuitively, the contract is structured to mini- 
mize the expected  default costs,  which are the agency costs of borrowing 
in  this  example.  Making  the  borrower  the  residual  claimant  accom- 
plishes  this goal.1 
A key point is that the default costs make credit rationing possible,  as 
illustrated  in Figure 1. 0 is an index  of project quality; and projects are 
ordered  on  the  horizontal  axis from high  quality to low  quality, where 
low quality ones  have less favorable return distributions.  The solid curve 
reflects combinations  of x and  0 which  permit lenders  to receive a com- 
petitive  return. The curve bends  backward because  after a point further 
increases in x lower lenders'  expected  return; the rise in expected  default 
costs  (due  to the rise in the default  probability) begins  to outweigh  the 
gain from a higher  non-default  payment.  As a result, projects of quality 
less  than 0', the value  of 0 at which  the curve bends  backward, will not 
receive  funding  even  though  some  of them  would  be profitable in the 
absence  of informational  problems. 
Another  important  insight  is  that  financial  intermediation  emerges 
endogenously.  In order  to avoid  the  waste  incurred in having  lenders 
independently  audit a borrower in default,  the optimal arrangement has 
lenders  delegate  the auditing  responsibility  to an intermediary. That is, 
lenders  deposit  their funds with an intermediary who  then channels  the 
funds  to  the  borrower  under  a bilateral contractual arrangement.  The 
incentive  problem between  the intermediary  and its depositors  (deposi- 
tors cannot  observe  the  intermediary's  returns) is overcome  by having 
the intermediary  hold  a perfectly diversified  portfolio,  guaranteeing  de- 
positors  a sure return. 
A substantial part of the paper explores how a unit banking regulation 
1. Making  the  borrower  the  residual  claimant  as a device  to solve  an incentive  problem 
with lenders  is another example  of what Hall (1989) terms the "back-to-the-wall" theory 
of finance. 342 *  GERTLER 
could  influence  real activity. It is now  easy  to see  the basic reasoning. 
Unit banking  restricts  the  ability  of  an  intermediary  to  diversify.  This 
implies  intermediaries  can fail (not be able to offer depositors  the  safe 
rate of return in all states  of nature).  Since diversification  is no  longer 
available as a device  to solve  the incentive  problem,  individual  deposi- 
tors must audit intermediaries  in default.  The net effect is to increase the 
average  agency  costs  involved  in lending  to  any  given  borrower.  The 
dotted  line  in  Figure  1 portrays  the  combinations  of  the  non-default 
payment  x and project quality 0 needed  to guarantee lenders a competi- 
tive return under  unit  banking.  The curve bends  backward before  the 
corresponding  curve  for  laissez-faire  banking  (the  solid  line).  This  is 
because  total  default  costs  are larger under  unit  banking,  making  ex- 
pected  default costs  rise at a faster rate. As a result the reservation level 
of  project  quality  under  unit  banking,  Ou  is  higher,  implying  a lower 
market equilibrium level  of investment. 
Figure  1 
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The main  point  of the  paper  is to examine  the effects  of two  restric- 
tions on intermediation  for aggregate  fluctuations.  One is the unit bank- 
ing regulation  described  above and the other is a limitation on the kinds 
of  liabilities  banks  can  offer.  The  restrictions  are chosen  because  they 
applied  in the U.S.  at the turn of the century but not in Canada, permit- 
ting an informal way  to test the predictions  of the analysis. 
In the  theoretical  model,  mean  preserving  spreads  in project return 
distributions  propagate  fluctuations  by inducing  countercyclical  move- 
ments in the degree  of credit rationing.  In periods of high risk, expected 
default costs rise (shifting  in the curve in Figure 1), lowering  the market 
level of investment;  vice-versa in periods of low risk. The model predicts 
further that  fluctuations  are greater under  laissez-faire  than  under  le- 
gally restricted intermediation.  The result arises,  roughly  speaking,  be- 
cause  the  credit  demand  and  supply  functions  are more  elastic  under 
laissez-faire:  elimination  of the  high  agency  costs  associated  with  unit 
bank makes credit demand  more elastic, while elimination  of the restric- 
tion on the kinds of liabilities intermediaries  can offer does  the same for 
credit supply.  The result  seems  more straightforward  (at least to me) if 
one  recognizes  that  not  only  is  the  variance  of  output  higher  under 
laissez-faire,  so is the mean.  The lower  agency  costs under  laissez-faire 
permit  a higher  average  level  of  investment,  as  can  be  inferred  from 
Figure 1. 
Overall,  the  theoretical  model  is rich,  and  cleverly  constructed.  The 
descriptive  comparison  of  the  U.S.  and  Canadian  financial  systems  is 
very interesting;  this kind of historical evidence  provides  a useful  back- 
ground for thinking  about the best way to regulate (or deregulate) finan- 
cial markets.  In this  regard,  I would  be interested  in seeing  more  evi- 
dence  bearing  on  the  relative  efficiencies  of the  two  financial systems. 
For example,  one  possible  disadvantage  of the "laissez-faire" Canadian 
system  was  the  emergence  of a heavily  concentrated  banking  industry, 
suggesting  possible  inefficiencies  in intermediation  because of imperfect 
competition.  If data on spreads between  deposit  and loan rates are avail- 
able, it may be possible  to empirically ascertain whether  the Canadian or 
U.S. system  is more efficient.2 
The main difficulty with the paper is that the evidence  used to support 
the theory is at best suggestive.  Because the number of data points is so 
limited, any kind of formal analysis is impossible.  It is indeed  an interest- 
ing puzzle  that the Canadian economy  at the turn of the century was so 
much  more  volatile  than  the  U.S.  economy,  particularly given  that the 
2. Depositor  losses  may  not  be a totally accurate measure  of efficiency  since  it does  not 
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ratio of agricultural to industrial production was higher in Canada. How- 
ever,  more  knowledge  about  the  two  economies  would  be  desirable 
before  arriving  at  the  conclusion  that  differences  in  financial  market 
regulations  could  largely explain  the differences  in output  fluctuations. 
In this vein,  it would  be useful  to know  whether  the theoretical model is 
capable of explaining  the quantitative  differences  involved.  What kinds 
of  parameter  restrictions  are  necessary?  Exploring  this  avenue  might 
provide  another  way  to check  the  plausibility  of the  story. Qualitative 
predictions  alone  do not seem  sufficient here. 
It is also  fair to ask whether  Steve's  framework  adequately  captures 
the impact of widespread  bank failures.  I think he is right to insist  that 
previous  literature ignores  some  parallels between  bank failures and the 
failures of non-financial  corporations.  However,  the  costs  of bank fail- 
ures in his framework are limited to depositors  auditing expenses.  There 
is no suspension  of lending  owing  to previous  bank failures; new  inter- 
mediaries  crop  up  immediately  in  the  subsequent  period  to  facilitate 
lending.  This is distinct from Bernanke (1983) who  emphasizes  that sys- 
tematic bank failures  can lead  to a loss  of intermediary  services  for an 
indefinite  period,  implying  a prolonged  period of disruption because  of 
credit  being  choked  off  partly  or completely  to  certain  sectors  of  the 
economy.  It is also distinct from Friedman and Schwartz who emphasize 
the impact on the money  supply. 
Who is right is an empirical question.  However,  it seems to me that the 
various  theories  are more  compatible  than the paper implies,  since  the 
version  of  Steve's  model  with  bank  failures  predicts  not  only  a lower 
variance of output,  but a lower  mean  as well.  Further, the model  econ- 
omy with  bank failures is (roughly  speaking)  less efficient than the one 
where  failures are absent. 
In the end,  this paper raises many interesting  questions.  Perhaps the 
most compelling  involve  issues  of financial market regulation.  In Steve's 
model,  laissez-faire  is optimal; the government  is no more efficient than 
private lenders in dealing with the agency problems.  Similar results arise 
in other papers (though  not exclusively).  Most countries,  however,  regu- 
late  banking  and  financial  markets.  More  generally,  safeguarding  the 
financial system  is considered  an important  task of government  policy. 
One possibility  for this discrepancy  between  theory and practice is that 
policy makers have been misinformed.  Another is that something  impor- 
tant has been left out of the theoretical models.  My own view  is that the 
frontier of this theoretical research, well reflected in this paper, is provid- 
ing useful  qualitative insights  into how the financial sector interacts with 
the macroeconomy.  For the time being,  though,  any policy  conclusions 
must be regarded as highly  tentative. Comment  345 
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1. Introduction 
Stephen  Williamson's  paper  investigates  the  consequences  for 
macroeconomic  fluctuations  of two types of restrictions on financial inter- 
mediaries: geographic  limitations and limitations on the issuance  of spe- 
cific types  of  liabilities.  He  constructs  a two-period  model  to examine 
these effects and then tests the model with data for the U.S. and Canada 
covering  1870-1913  and 1954-87. 
These comments  will address both Williamson's theory and his empiri- 
cal application. 
2. Theory 
Williamson's  major theoretical  results are that both types  of restrictions 
tend  to dampen  macroeconomic  fluctuations.  The intuition  underlying 
these  results  are as follows:  Geographic  limitations  on depositories'  ac- 
tivities mean that banks cannot diversify  their loan portfolios over more 
regions and are therefore more likely to fail than are banks that are not so 
limited.  Consequently,  depositors  and  other  creditors  of banks  find  it 
worthwhile  to engage  in more monitoring  of the former class of banks; 
this is especially  true when  banks' loans are of lower quality (i.e.,  when 
the funded  projects have lower internal rates of return). This extra moni- 
toring means  extra frictions and costs  for loans when  interests  rates are 
low, which  causes  the effective  demand  curve for loans facing the bank 
to become  less  elastic.  Any  exogenous  shock  that causes  a shift in this 
less  elastic  demand  curve  will  consequently  have  a lesser  effect on the 
aggregate quantity of loans; hence,  aggregate economic activity will tend 
to be more stable. 
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Further, limitations  on  the  issuance  of some  types  of liabilities mean 
that, ceteris  paribus, some potential  providers of funds to banks choose  to 
hold their assets  in currency instead.  With a less elastic supply  of funds 
to banks,  shifts in the demand  curve for loans again have a lesser effect 
on the aggregate  quantity  of loans. 
I have  no  quarrel with  the basic construction  of the model.  But I do 
question  the likely quantitative importance of the effects that Williamson 
has isolated;  other effects  may well  overshadow  Williamson's  phenom- 
ena.  For example,  with  respect  to  geographic  limitations,  the  greater 
likelihood  of bank failure that is associated  with greater limitations tends 
to be countercyclical.  In addition,  as a number  of authors have  noted,1 
these  bank  failures  can  have  significant  direct  macroeconomic  conse- 
quences  that  exacerbate  macroeconomic  instability.  Thus,  geographic 
limitations  on  intermediaries  have  consequences  that can both  exacer- 
bate  (the  direct  effect)  and  moderate  (the  Williamson  effect) 
macroeconomic  stability.  Williamson  does  not  offer  a  more  general 
model  that would  encompass  both effects  and compare their likely im- 
portance.  I strongly  suspect  that Williamson's  effect is likely to be less 
important. 
3. Empirical  Tests 
Williamson tests his model by comparing macroeconomic  fluctuations in 
the U.S.  and  Canada  during  the years  1870-1913  and  1954-87.  During 
1870-1913,  Canadian  banks  were  more free to issue  private bank notes 
and to establish  branches  throughout  Canada; U.S. national banks were 
more restricted in their ability to issue  bank notes  (the notes  had to be 
backed directly by U.S.  government  bonds)  and were  restricted to local 
areas  within  states.  Williamson's  model  predicts  that  macroeconomic 
fluctuations  should  have been  dampened  more in the U.S.  than in Can- 
ada,  and  he  finds  this  to have  been  the case.  During  1954-87,  neither 
banking system  could issue  private bank notes,  and deposit insurance in 
the U.S.  smoothed  the  instabilities  that localized  banking  might  other- 
wise have created. Williamson's  model predicts that macroeconomic fluc- 
tuations in the two countries  should  have been more similar in this later 
period  than  in the  earlier period;  again,  he  finds  this to have  been  so. 
Before commenting  on  these  empirical findings,  I believe  it is worth 
noting  the  historical  link between  the U.S.  bank note  policy, which  in- 
sisted  that nationally  chartered banks back their notes  with U.S. bonds, 
and the tradition of local geographic  restrictions. The period of the 1840s 
1. See for example,  Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Bernanke (1983). Comment  347 
and  1850s were  a period  of "wildcat banking" in the U.S.  Many  states 
freely issued  charters to banks,  but restricted them  to local geographic 
areas.  These  state-chartered  banks  freely  issued  bank notes  that were 
backed by the banks' normal portfolios  of loans and investments.  Some 
of these  banks failed,  at least partially because  they were restricted geo- 
graphically,  causing  losses  for the  holders  of their notes.2 As  a conse- 
quence,  the National  Currency Act of 1863 and the National Bank Act of 
1864 established  a system  of nationally chartered banks (and established 
the  federal  Office  of  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  to  charter and 
regulate  them).  To ensure  a more  stable currency, these  national banks 
were allowed  only  to issue  notes  that were backed by U.S.  government 
bonds.  (At the same time, a 10 percent tax was levied on the notes issued 
by state chartered banks,  in an effort to tax them out of existence.  This 
effort  almost  succeeded,  but  the  state  banks  developed  checking  ac- 
counts as an alternative form of liability and thereby managed  to survive 
and prosper.) 
An  interesting  historical  footnote  to  this  episode  should  be  added: 
One  hundred  twenty-five  years  later we  have  come  full circle. In the 
wake of concerns  about the current problems with federal deposit  insur- 
ance,  some  current observers3 have  suggested  that "narrow banks" are 
the  only  type  of  depository  that  should  be  backed  by  federal  deposit 
insurance.  What  is  a  "narrow  bank"?  A  bank  that  has  its  liabilities 
backed solely  by short-term U.S.  debt! 
Let me now  return to Williamson's  empirical results.  First, I question 
whether  the differences  in the U.S. and Canadian bank note restrictions 
in  the  1870-1913  period  are  adequately  represented  in  Williamson's 
model.  The U.S.  national banks were  not forbidden from issuing  notes, 
as is represented  in Wiliamson's  model; however,  they did have to back 
them  with  U.S.  bonds.  How  much  of a difference  did this make? I am 
not entirely  sure.  Williamson  does  not address  the point.  Also,  as was 
mentioned  above,  state-chartered  banks  continued  in  existence  and 
could offer yet a different kind of liability, checking  accounts.  The pres- 
ence  of these  state-chartered  banks-by  1890 they constituted  over half 
of the total number  of banks in the U.S.  and also more than half of the 
total assets  of banks in the U.S.-surely  influenced  macroeconomic  sta- 
bility or instability  in  the  U.S.  Also,  as early as 1870, the value  of the 
deposits  in just the national banks alone was more than twice the value 
of their bank  notes,  and  by  1896 the  ratio was  more  than  ten  to one. 
However,  Williamson  proceeds  as if the  national  banks  were  the  only 
2. A discussion  of these  losses  is found  in Rolnick and Weber (1983). 
3. See,  for example,  Litan (1987). For a discussion  of Litan's proposal,  see  White (1988). 348 *  WHITE 
depositories  and  their bank  notes  were  the  only  form of bank liability 
that could affect macroeconomic  stability in the U.S. 
Second,  and more important,  there are other, more plausible explana- 
tions for Williamson's  empirical results. During the 1870-1913 period the 
Canadian economy  was  more oriented  toward natural resource produc- 
tion than was true of the U.S. economy,  and the two economies  were less 
linked then than they were in the later period.  This greater emphasis  on 
natural resources  is  surely  the  major reason  for the  greater macroeco- 
nomic  fluctuations  in the Canadian  economy  during the earlier period. 
Further, during the 1954-87 period the two economies  were more simi- 
lar in structure and were more closely  linked: lower import tariffs, a free 
trade pact in automotive  production  that started in 1965, and easier trans- 
border capital flows.  These phenomena  are the most likely reasons for the 
greater similarity in macroeconomic  fluctuations  during this period. 
If my explanations  are correct, then  data on cross-country  correlations 
of GNP and prices should  show  a higher correlation in the latter period 
than  in  the  earlier  period.  Unfortunately,  the  results  of  this  test  are 
mixed.  Tables 5 and 8 of Williamson's  paper show  different results with 
respect to cross-country  correlations of GNP, depending  on which of two 
series on U.S.  GNP is used.  The same  two  tables do,  however,  show  a 
much  higher  cross-country  correlation  of  prices4 in  the  second  period 
than in the first period,  which  is consistent  with my explanation. 
4. Conclusion 
In sum,  though  Williamson's  model  is clearly of theoretical interest,  its 
results  are likely  to  involve  second-order  effects  with  respect  to  real- 
world  macroeconomic  stability. His  empirical  findings,  though  consis- 
tent with his model's  predictions,  are, I believe,  better explained by first- 
order features  of the U.S.  and Canadian economies.  Future research in 
this vein, then, would  require a more complete model and a more sophis- 
ticated set of empirical tests  that would  better allow  Williamson  to sort 
out his theoretical effects from the first-order phenomena  that are clearly 
also present. 
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Discussion 
Michael Bordo said that Canada is a more resource-based  economy  than 
the U.S.,  and also that demand  in Canada is sensitive  to that in the U.S., 
making  Canadian  output  more  volatile  than  U.S.  output.  He  further 
noted  that branch  closings  may  have  effects,  such  as loss  of customer 
relations,  even  if  deposits  are  not  lost.  David  Romer  questioned  the 
magnitude  of the  effects  captured  by the model,  in particular how  big 
the difference  in the elasticity of demand  would  have to be between  the 
U.S. and Canada. 
Julio Rotemberg asked whether  banks saved each other because  there 
were  monopoly  rents.  Williamson  responded  that  banks  might  save 
each other to prevent  more regulation.  White added  that an increase in 
rents  would  create  more  implicit  capital and  make  firms less  likely  to 
engage  in risky behavior. 
Allan  Drazen  asked  how  bank  runs  would  be  interpreted  in  this 
model.  Williamson  stated  that  this  is  not  really  a model  of  runs  but 
should  be interpreted  only as a model  of bank failures. 
Ben Bernanke noted  that in this model  the real economy  causes  fail- 
ures,  but  failures  do  not  feed  back to the real economy.  In higher  fre- 
quency  data, he argued,  the latter feedback can be identified.  Jeff Miron 
noted  that the Canadian  bank cooperation  suggests  implicit deposit  in- 
surance.  Williamson  responded  that this  is consistent  with  his  results 
and acts as if Canada had one large intermediary. 
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